So far, the smoke has cleared from the streets of Jakarta, Indonesia (ID) and other major cities but the embers of public anger still glow. The recent wave of nationwide protests, sparked by parliamentary perks and rising living costs, has subsided for now. Yet the echoes of 1998 are unmistakable, raising a profound question: Is the current government’s response — a limited cabinet reshuffle and promises of police reform — enough to prevent a more profound political crisis or does it merely delay the inevitable?
To understand the stakes, one must look back to the student-led “Reformasi” movement that toppled the 32-year authoritarian rule of President Suharto. The parallels between then and now are startling. Both movements were ignited by a potent mix of economic hardship and a public perception of an out-of-touch, corrupt political elite. In 1998, it was the collapse of the rupiah and the Asian financial crisis that exposed a system rife with cronyism. Today, it is the rising cost of living and the spectacle of a lavish housing allowance for parliamentarians that has inflamed a public already struggling with austerity measures.
The catalyst for mass anger in both eras was a tragic act of state violence. The killing of four students at Trisakti University in May 1998 became the flashpoint for widespread riots and demands for Suharto’s resignation. In the recent unrest, the death of a motorcycle taxi driver Affan Kurniawan, after he was run over by a police vehicle, circulated widely online and galvanized a new generation of protesters. This shared grievance against state impunity is a powerful through-line connecting the two movements.
However, the differences are just as critical. The 1998 protests were a cohesive, national movement with a clear, singular goal: to end Suharto’s dictatorship. The current unrest, in contrast is more decentralized and “leaderless,” with a coalition of groups coordinating via social media as noted by researchers. This diffuse structure makes the movement less predictable but also potentially less sustainable, as competing interests can cause divisions. The current government, led by President Prabowo Subianto also lacks the absolute power of Suharto’s New Order regime. While the protests are a serious challenge, the country’s democratic institutions however flawed, offer a different kind of pressure release valve than existed in 1998.
The government’s limited response — cabinet changes and promises of police reform — is classic damage control, offering the appearance of accountability. While President Prabowo has conceded to some demands, these concessions are unlikely to satisfy a public whose frustration stems from deeper, systemic issues like economic inequality and a culture of impunity. As shown in 1998, a superficial response only delays the inevitable. The government has bought itself time but it has not resolved the fundamental crisis of confidence.
